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U.K. Police Vehicle Crashes
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Investigation of Road Traffic Incidents (RTI’s) involving police vehicles, 1998
– 2001: Identifying common factors and the lessons to be learned Dr
David Best Head
of Research
POLICE
COMPLAINTS AUTHORITY 10 GREAT GEORGE ST LONDON
SW1P 3AE May
2002 FATAL
PURSUIT Investigation
of Road Traffic Incidents (RTI’s) involving police vehicles, 1998 -
2001: Identifying common factors and the lessons to be learned Published
by: Police
Complaints Authority 10
Great George Street London
SW1P
3AE Tel:
020-7273 6450 www.pca.gov.uk ©
Crown Copyright 2002 This
material may be freely reproduced except for sale or advertising
purposes. ISBN
0-9533157-8-9 Price
£5.00
Acknowledgements I
would like to thank Gareth Basten and Emma Brown from the research
department of the PCA for their considerable efforts in gathering the
materials for this report. Particularly thanks are also due to the
members of the PCA for their support and guidance with this work,
especially Diane Hughes and Anne Boustred whose patience and
commitment proved to be of inestimable value. Finally, I would like to
thank the caseworkers of the PCA for their patience when I
commandeered their work
and the expert input from the Metropolitan Police Service, from
Professor Geoffrey Alpert for his comments and advice and Deputy Chief
Constable Bill Brereton from the Association of Chief Police Officers
for his considerable input.
Executive summary Key findings To
address the marked increases in road traffic collisions referred to
the PCA (particularly relating to police pursuits), we investigated 85
cases that occurred between 1998 and 2001 which resulted in a total of
91 fatalities. The main findings were that:
Why
is this area worth investigating? The
push by the Police Complaints Authority to address the issue of road
traffic collisions is motivated by the marked increase in voluntary
referrals from forces in recent years. In the first nine months of
this year there have been a total of 42 incidents (involving 35 deaths
and 17 serious injuries), including 30 deaths from pursuits (resulting
from 24 separate incidents). Thus
the number of deaths from pursuits supervised by the PCA has risen
from 9 in 1997/98 to 30 in the first nine months of 2001/2002 (see
Figure1).
Figure
1: Number of fatalities from pursuits (1997/98-2001/02) The
aim of the current investigation was to look at road traffic
collisions referred to the PCA in recent years in a systematic way to
assess what patterns emerge and what lessons can be learned that might
prevent such incidents from occurring in the future. The evidence presented would suggest that, while the police
have some very difficult decisions to make in short periods of time
around public safety and the prevention of crime, many of these
incidents are potentially preventable, either by changes in force
policy or by proactive measures designed to bring out safe and
effective resolution of such incidents. What
is the project building on? There
has been relatively little systematic research work done in this area,
particularly in the UK, and so we are often reliant on making
inferences from American research, with all the pitfalls this incurs
in terms of reliability and relevance. One of the few UK studies,
published by the Home Office in 1997, examined 770 police vehicle
accidents resulting in serious injury (39% in pursuits/follows, 29% in
routine patrols and 23% in emergency responses). The study found that
around one in six pursuits were being undertaken by drivers not
trained to that level, and a similar proportion in response situations
where emergency equipment had not been used. The authors also found
that it was police drivers at the lower levels of training who were
far more likely to actually make contact with other vehicles during
these incidents. However, this study has been superseded by subsequent
policy initiatives (such as the Lind report) and so its current
relevance may be limited. Thus,
we have to turn to US research, albeit aware of its limitations, in
attempting to provide a more recent evidence base. A policy change in
Miami-Dade county in 1992 regarding the regulation of pursuits from
‘at the police driver’s discretion’ to ‘for violent felonies
only” led to a 92% reduction in the frequency of pursuits within one
year, with a commensurate reduction in injuries and no evidence of
increase in rates of fleeing or in the total volume of crime. In
contrast when Omaha increased the permissiveness of their pursuit
policy in 1993 to ‘at the police driver’s discretion’, there was
a 600% increase in pursuits within one year – suggesting that there
is a close link between officer discretion permitted and the total
volume of pursuits. However, it is not possible from these studies to
infer what the effects were on the total detection rates of crime or
whether this change became public knowledge and so affected the
decision-making of criminals and others who may flee. Further
US evidence suggests that the riskiness of pursuits can also be
assessed actuarially – and that the risk of personal injury is
doubled when more than one police vehicle is involved, and
significantly increased for speeds of more than 65 mph and in built-up
residential areas. This is particularly problematic when, as has been
estimated, more than 80% of pursuits may result from perceived traffic
offences and when more than half of all collisions resulting occur
within two minutes of the initiation of the chase. Although it is
clear that engaging in police pursuits carries increased risk to the
public and those involved, the duty of the police to apprehend
criminals and to prevent dangerous driving provides the dilemma that
is at the heart of the current research project. How
was the study carried out and with what objectives? The
aim of the study was to examine factors that underlie the increase in
serious injury or fatal road traffic incidents (RTIs) referred to the
PCA between 1998 and 2001. The study takes a sample of 85 cases that
have been referred in this period – 64 classified as pursuit/follows
and 21 other serious injury RTIs – and examines antecedents to the
events (including driving characteristics of each participant), the
context of the collision and aspects of the subsequent investigation
– to attempt to identify lessons that can be learned, related both
to policy and practice, that may help to arrest the worrying and
tragic trend that provided the impetus for this work. What
were the main findings of the study? In
total the 85 cases involved 91 fatalities although 12 of the incidents
were serious injury only, with the majority of the incidents occurring
at night in towns and on Saturday or Sundays. The majority of the
incidents also occurred in 30 mph speed limit areas and when the road
was either quiet or almost deserted. The main differences between the
events classed as pursuit/follows (n=64) and the other incidents
(emergency responses, standard patrol incidents and officers coming
off duty)(n=21) were that the speeds were higher in the
pursuits/follows, that the drivers involved had more years driving
experience than in the other kinds of incidents and that each event
resulted in a greater number of fatalities. The last of these findings
may be a consequence of a differential threshold effect for referring
cases to the PCA (ie pursuits are only referred if there are
fatalities involved, whereas non-pursuits may be referred when less
serious injuries occur), or from the lower speeds involved. In
the cases where it was possible to make a distinction between events
described as ‘pursuits’ and those defined as ‘follows’ by the
Investigating Officer (IO), there were very few significant
differences, with the most marked mean differences being that, while
‘pursuits’ had a higher average speed, the mean distance between
the vehicles was lower in ‘safe follows’, that pursuits were more
likely to involve stolen cars and that there were attempts to stop the
target vehicle. The most striking finding, however, was that there
were no identifiable behavioural markers that distinguished the two.
Furthermore, it was not possible to make this distinction in a number
of cases, and the terms were used interchangeably in a small number of
the reports. The
data supported the Home Office work in suggesting that the collisions,
when they occur in these incidents, rarely involve police vehicles
colliding with other vehicles, with the most frequent outcome that the
target car collides with either a fixed object (such as a tree) or
with another vehicle or pedestrian. This however, is a double-edged
sword for the police – while this means they are well enough trained
rarely to collide, it means that this is not a good indicator of the
riskiness of the situation. It is the lower skill level, that of the
pursued driver, that should be accounted for in assessing risk, not
the skills of the police driver. In contrast, for the vast majority of
the non-pursuit/follow cases (19/25) the referral results from a
collision involving the police vehicle. With
regard to the suspect vehicle in the pursuit/follow incidents, this
was stolen in 29/64 incidents, and the car had significant flaws in
22/64 of the incidents. Of the suspect car drivers who were alcohol
tested (n=48), 56.3% were over the legal alcohol limit, while around
one quarter of those tested (7/30) were positive for cannabis.
Forty-five of fifty-one drivers for whom information was available had
a mean of 6.3 convictions each, further indicating that this group
were often criminally involved, although this often would not be known
to the officers at the time of the stop and would not necessarily have
been relevant to the reason for the stops. Finally, 30 of 42 for whom
the data were available had not been wearing seatbelts at the time of
the collision, increasing the risk of injury during the pursuit/follow
although this would not necessarily have been known to the police
officers, other than the two incidents where this was one of the
reasons for initiating the pursuit or follow. This
means that the police were often correct in their suspicions about the
behaviour of the suspect vehicle when they failed to stop, and that
relatively few involved completely ‘innocent’ drivers. However,
this is a question of proportionality – while the police drivers may
well be correct in wishing to stop the suspect vehicle, the extent of
this objective should be weighed against the risk to both vehicles and
all other road users. For this reason, the report recommends that the
decision to initiate a pursuit or follow should be controlled
centrally and that risk assessment and decision-making (as evidenced
by clear communications with the control room) are explicit and
ongoing over the course of the incident. It is not the aim or desire
of the authors to end pursuits, rather to reduce the risk to road
users by reducing the discretion of individual police drivers and
increasing the role of police managers. Information
on the characteristics of the police drivers was gathered far less
consistently, possibly because the police vehicles were rarely
involved in the actual pursuit/follow collisions, and one of the major
recommendations of the study is that this information deficit should
be rectified. Where this information was provided, over three-quarters
of the drivers in the study follow/pursuits had been pursuit trained
and they had been driving police vehicles for an average of 6.4 years.
There are similar limitations around the characteristics of police
passengers and around the experience, role and training of the control
room staff involved, and, more generally, about the nature and quality
of communication and risk assessment. Reasons
for initiating the pursuit/follows were grouped into three broad
groups – traffic violations (n=36), serious, non-traffic crime
(n=22), and other events (n=6), which consisted of believed drunk
driving and routine stops. It
is of concern that the speeds involved, the distances between the
police vehicle and the target vehicle and the number of fatalities
accruing did not differ between these events. The fact that the
reasons for initiating were so variable, and in many cases led to far
greater risk taking on the part of the driver of the target vehicle,
provokes questions of escalation and proportionality where for
relatively minor offences, major risk-taking behaviours result. In
effect, what is demonstrated is that many pursuit/follows involve
poorly trained, often unqualified or disqualified drivers, a
significant proportion of whom are under the influence of alcohol or
illicit drugs, and who feel provoked to engage in high-risk driving
behaviours, often for relatively minor traffic offences. Furthermore,
their refusal to stop may be taken by the officers, often rightly, as
an indication that they have engaged in other forms of criminal
behaviour. Main recommendations The
main recommendations from the study are that: 1.
The current definitions of pursuit/follow are not helpful and
can often be misleading and should be scrapped, to be replaced by more
behaviourally determined and measurable categories. The definition of
an authorised pursuit would be: “Where the police identify a failure
to stop, and respond leading to an increase in risk taking (evidenced
by breaches of road traffic law) by both police and suspect vehicle,
and where emergency equipment is used as part of a clear plan to bring
the suspect vehicle to a safe stop. All other increases in risk taking
behaviour initiated by police responses will be classed as
unauthorised pursuits.” 2.
Significant increases in police training are required,
particularly in the area of communication, and it is recommended that
specific training is provided for delivering commentaries for police
vehicle passengers. 3.
Training and monitoring are required in the adequacy of risk
assessment, and its evolution over the course of pursuit/follows. This
would help to ensure that escalation of incidents does not occur
unnecessarily and that vehicles are not pursued where the risk to road
users or the general public is disproportionate to the original reason
for attempting to stop a vehicle or emerging reasons. 4.
If a pursuit/follow is assessed to be too risky or too
disproportionate for the original offence, the driver should pull over
to the side of the road and should not continue to follow the target. 5.
There is considerable need for Investigating Officers, when
producing reports for PCA supervision, to be consistent in the type of
information they produce and a pro forma that constitutes a minimum
requirement for this is provided as Appendix 2 of the main report. 6.
Police force managers need to monitor and manage
pursuit/follows more effectively for the centre, increasing levels of
control over high-risk drivers and, separately, monitoring the
pursuit/follow histories of individual officers. 7.
The latter point is linked to a general requirement for forces
to improve the quality of their data collection and management in this
area – it is most unhelpful that it is not possible to work out the
risks associated with pursuit/follows as some forces do not gather or
provide information in this area. 8.
IOs should be particularly clear that pursuing in convoys or in
unmarked (cars which have no concealed emergency equipment) is wholly
unacceptable, and exceptional circumstances demonstrated, if this is
not to result in disciplinary action for the officers involved. The
cases included in the study clearly indicate that in only a very few
cases was there flagrant disregard for the guidance in place –
however such instances, involving pursuit/follows in completely
unmarked cars or involving more than two police vehicles should not be
accepted by the PCA or by police investigators. In the majority of
other cases, however, the officers were asked to make complex
judgements in a very short space of time, in which the risk to the
users of the highway are weighed against the public well-being issues
related to crime detection and public safety. The core recommendation
of this report is that this decision is, where possible, made explicit
and managed by the police control room, to reduce individual officer
discretion and to improve the centralised management of police chases.
The increase in referred fatal road traffic collisions cannot be
reversed overnight but can be achieved through an effective management
approach based on adequate communication, risk assessment and
evaluation procedure undertaken by officers. Overview
and objectives In
the Chairman’s Foreword to the 2000/2001 Annual Report of the
Independent Police Complaints Authority, Sir Alistair Graham pointed out
that “there has been a 178 per cent increase in fatalities involving
pursuits over four years, which is totally unacceptable”. While there
may be some debate about the provenance of this data, there has been a
marked increase in such referred cases, largely resulting from a
dramatic increase in the number of police pursuits and chases that
result in serious injury or death that are referred to the PCA. He went
on to argue that “Police forces must take urgent steps to meet the
rising tide of public concern” while the main body of the report
asserts that “there are still reports of officers participating in
pursuits or responding to emergency calls, with inadequate training and
using inappropriate vehicles”. The
rise in RTI’s generally and in pursuits has continued into the most
recent year (2001/2002) in spite of the Chairman’s comments, with 44
fatalities resulting from pursuits and follows involving the police.
This represents an increase of 489% in the number of deaths resulting
from pursuits referred to the PCA in a five-year period (see Figure 1
below). While increased awareness of these issues may have led to
changes in reporting practices by police forces, the trend is
sufficiently dramatic and the numbers sufficiently large that close
scrutiny is required and remedial action urgently needed. It is also
worth noting that the number of fatalities from non-pursuits in the same
period has remained relatively consistent (between 6 and 9 in each of
the last four years), that the rise in pursuit deaths cannot be regarded
as reflecting an overall increase in police road use or general
reporting of traffic incidents to the PCA.
Figure
1: Number of fatalities from pursuits (1997/98-2001/02) The
aim of the current research investigation is an attempt to make sense of
these figures and to work out what can be done to arrest this alarming
trend which has seen not only an increase in pursuit deaths but an
increase at an increasing rate, in spite of the production and
implementation of the Lind Report and the subsequent implementation
assessment reported in the Cullen Report. The research evidence outlined
below is an initial attempt to make sense of this dramatic and
unacceptable rise and to offer recommendations on how the current trend
can be reversed. Literature review Before
outlining the research method and results, it is important to
contextualise the project in terms of relevant pieces of research and
policy that precede it which have implications either for the definition
and understanding of RTI’s or which have demonstrated empirical
salience to the current research question. Much of the limited research
evidence to date comes from the United States. This creates two
difficulties – first , that there are major limitations in translating
US work to a UK context and second that it suggests that this issue has
not been sufficiently prioritised by researchers in the US and the UK.
However, the comparative literature does identify important issues that
are pertinent to the current investigation. International
evidence base Risks
and dangers associated with police pursuits
“Research
on pursuit policy development, pursuit outcome, evaluation of legal
decisions, and civil liability has identified four critical factors on
which officers and supervisors must base decisions, to pursue or not to
pursue (Alpert 1993, Fridell 1992): the known violation, the area in
which the chase occurred, traffic conditions and weather conditions”
(Alpert, 1997, p348). As the international literature estimates that 75%
of pursuits resulted in the capture of the suspect, 40% in an accident,
20% resulted in an injury and 1% with a death (Alpert and Fridell, 1992;
Alpert et al, 1996; Auten, 1994; Falcone, Wells and Charles, 1992), it
is critical to consider what the factors are that motivate pursuits and
what the implications are for both crime and for the safety of officers,
of the offenders and for members of the general public. Among
5 US studies between 1982 and 1992, the evidence suggests that 68-77% of
pursuits ended in the arrest of the suspect. Among those that examined
termination factors, 18-36% of the suspects voluntarily terminated by
stopping and surrendering. Most of the pursuits were of short duration
and distance. The pursuit accident rates ranged from 26-41%, injuries
occurred in 9-17% of the accidents and fatalities in 0-3% of cases. In
an analysis of rates of injury and fatal accidents in Michigan state
police pursuits, Payne and Fenske (1994) reported preliminary findings
in one state which indicated that police underreport pursuits by a
factor of two and it may be as high as 10 (Payne, 1996). Falcone et al
(1992) state that the under-estimations may be by a factor of 5-15
times, which has the paradoxical effect of increasing the perceived
riskiness of pursuits by over-stating the ratio of injury to event.
Crew,
Fridell and Pursell (1995) report that 38% of the pursuits initiated for
a traffic violation result in a crash. The pursuits that have the
greatest likelihood of resulting in personal injury or death are
pursuits of suspected felons (17%) and drunk drivers (14%). The risk is
also mediated by the context of the pursuit - the risk of personal
injury was significantly greater according to Alpert (1997) when more
than one unit was involved (odds ratio of 2.03); 1.75 times greater for
pursuits in commercial rather than residential areas, and 1.78 higher
when the speeds exceeded 65 mph. This led Alpert to conclude that “In
general, when pursuits involve more than one unit, are in a commercial
rather than a residential area, and increase in speed to greater than
65mph, the odds of injury increase dramatically” (Alpert, 1997, p40).
Although these findings are dramatic, it is important to reiterate that
these findings refer to a country with a different culture, where the
physical layout of roads differs, and where police policy and activity
are not the same as those in the UK. Furthermore, the studies do not
measure nor account for the increased risk to the public if pursuits are
discontinued and either serious criminals are allowed to escape or drunk
drivers are not intercepted and arrested. Definitions and factors
around initiation of police pursuits A
US National Institute of Justice (1996) research brief concluded that
“the perceived severity of the offence committed by the fleeing
suspect is the major factor in determining whether or not police should
engage in or continue a chase. Therefore, policy might focus first on
the type of offence and second on risks to the public, especially
traffic patterns and congestion. A balance of these variables indicates
that an appropriate policy would limit chases to violent felons …”.
This approach has been adopted in Miami-Dade since 1992 when Miami-Dade
police force restricted pursuits to ‘violent felonies only’. The
consequence of this policy change was an 82% reduction in the rate of
pursuits leading to commensurate reductions in collisions, injuries and
fatalities, with no reported increases in either crime rates or the
number of suspects fleeing from police. Although anecdotal reports from
the UK would suggest that restrictions on pursuits have resulted in
problems associated with increased adolescent ‘joy-riding’, the lack
of adequate empirical support for this typifies the inadequacies of a
policy that is not shaped by evidence or evaluation. The
USNIJ report also concluded that unmarked vehicles should not be allowed
to engage in pursuits – and that they should not be allowed to violate
traffic laws. However, one of the major limitations on the research was
that it produced no research evidence on what proportion of those
directed to stop actually attempt to flee (the ‘rabbit theory’).
Separately, Canadian courts have also concluded that violation of
traffic laws while conducting a pursuit without emergency equipment can
constitute negligence. This
is strongly linked to the definition of what constitutes a pursuit and
how these issues are defined in policy terms. “A very strong consensus
appears to be emerging around the importance of clear and explicit
policies to guide pursuit decision making, and training to ensure
effective implementation of the policies.” (Royal Canadian Mounted
Police Report, 1992). International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)
has issued a model pursuit policy (1989) which requires: 1.
purpose 2.
policy 3.
definition 4.
procedures Alpert
and Dunham (1990) recorded the demographic characteristics of pursuit
suspects in southern Florida and found that 97% were male, with a mean
age of 23.5 years, and that 28% were white, 50% were black and 21% were
Hispanic. Brewer and McGrath’s (1991) review of police files in south
Australia characterised suspects as predominantly white, mainly
unemployed or unskilled and had been drinking. Many had extensive
criminal records but mainly for traffic, registration and licensing
offences. Black (1995), in a review of pursuit suspects in Washington,
concluded that “Only 11.8% of arrested suspects had fewer than three
prior arrests, whereas 67.3% had more than three felony arrests … The
profile that emerges is that those arrested in pursuits are hard core
criminals” (Black, 1995). Dunham
et al (1998) conducted 144 interviews with individuals who had recent
experience of being involved in a vehicular pursuit,
(94% of this group were male, with a mean age of 26.2 years).
From the total of 146 pursuits described,
30% were terminated when the suspect either gave themselves up or
stopped and ran on foot, 30% because the suspect’s vehicle crashed,
25% reported that they got away at least in the short term and 10% were
concluded by police interventions. 42% of the suspects said they were
impaired with either alcohol or drugs at the time of the pursuit. When
asked why they had fled, 32% reported that it was because they were
driving a stolen car, 27% said they were driving with a suspended
driver’s license and 27% were running from a crime scene or to avoid
an arrest, 21% said they were running because they did not want to face
the police under the influence of alcohol or drugs and 21% were afraid
of being beaten. Six factors predicted 77% of the variance in
suspects’ willingness to take extreme risks to avoid the police: ·
Previously having been
caught by the police ·
Thoughts about the
punishment ·
Concerns for their own
safety ·
They were driving under
the influence ·
Concern for the safety of
others ·
To avoid arrest The
authors concluded that understanding the interaction patterns between
officers and suspects becomes central to controlling the negative
outcomes of pursuits. Dunham et al (op cit) argued that if the officer
continued to pursue, it was likely that the suspect would continue to
flee. This then places considerable emphasis on the decision-making
skills of individual officers, based partly on training and partly on
the policy basis around which these decisions should be made. Training and policy for
pursuits There
is also clear evidence from British Columbia that refresher training has
a significant, although time-limited, impact on officer-responsible
accidents, which go beyond those associated with pursuits and follows.
Part of this emphasis on training and policy definition is attitudinally
focused and recognises the key role the officer plays in enacting the
procedure and guidance. As Alpert (1999) has argued, “Police officers
must be able to objectively weigh the risks to themselves, the public
and the suspect, throughout a pursuit” (Alpert, 1999, p31). Later in
the same report, Alpert (op cit) concluded that “pursuit training
which balances technical skill with decision-making and risk assessment
skills is essential and can be designed to support policy objectives
that limit the use of police pursuits” (Alpert, 1999, p33). What
makes this so important is the key question of proportionality - Alpert
(1992) estimated that 80% of police pursuits involve only traffic
violations, which shifts the calculus about the type and extent of risk
taking that is acceptable and the possible consequences for undertaking
the pursuit or follow. Given that many of the problems that arise may
result from uncertainties over the creation and implementation of
definitions, the prospective and retrospective categorisation of events
and the share of responsibility between the individual officer and the
police supervisor, the aim of training should be to make explicit these
potential areas of concern. This
links closely to issues of command and the US National Institute of
Justice – Pursuit Management Task Force (Research Preview, 1998)
reported on a survey of 419 heads of law enforcement agencies. This
group identified four key phases of a pursuit: 1.
Pre-pursuit phase: Time between the officer’s decision to stop
a vehicle and the officer’s recognition of the vehicle’s attempt to
flee (this is likely to be a key area for future research investigation) 2.
Communication phase: Period between the start of the pursuit and
the arrival of assisting officers and resources 3.
Resources phase: Period between the arrival of assisting
officers/resources and an attempt to terminate an in-progress pursuit 4.
Post-pursuit phase: Period encompassing any actions that occur
after the suspect’s vehicle has stopped fleeing or has eluded capture In
a separate piece of work for the US National Institute of Justice on
‘Police Pursuits: policies and training’, Alpert (1997) gathered
data from 308 police agencies on the number of pursuits officers had
engaged in during 1993, supplemented by case records of more than 1,000
pursuits conducted by Metro-Dade Police (Florida), 229 in Omaha,
Nebraska and 17 in Aiken, South California. They found that more than
50% of all pursuit collisions (as reported by agencies state-wide)
occurred during the first two minutes of a pursuit – more than 70%
occurred before the 6th minute of a pursuit. They found that
the best predictors of personal injury were a greater number of police
cars involved, involvement of other police agencies, high-speed chases
and chases in built-up non-residential areas. In
a factorial analysis of police pursuit driving decisions, Alpert (1998)
reported previous work by Falcone
(1994) that showed that most officers reported that reasons to terminate
a pursuit included traffic conditions, certain speed zones,
dangerousness of the offence and weather conditions. He also cites
Homant and Kennedy’s (1994) study of officers from 7 US states which
showed that in those with the most permissive policies, officers were
most inclined to pursue, while the more restrictive states had officers
less inclined to pursue. Alpert’s own research study was a comparison
of officers routinely involved in pursuits with those never involved in
pursuits and with police managers, across three police departments with
varying policies on pursuits – a study of 881 officers and 174
supervisors. The reported differences between officers’ and
supervisors’ attitudes were minor - regardless of the nature of the
pursuit policy, officers from the various agencies held similar views
about pursuits. Alpert
found that the officers’ responses show that they think the nature of
the original offence is the most important variable in deciding whether
to continue a pursuit. This factor is more than twice as important as
the environmental conditions, in determining whether to initiate or to
continue a pursuit. Officers were most likely to terminate pursuits
voluntarily when it was initiated for suspect vehicles (29%) and least
likely in chases initiated for felonies (16%). The conclusion drawn
about the impact of policy change in two of the case study areas was
that “when Metro-Dade adopted a ‘violent-felony only’ pursuit
policy in 1992, the number of pursuits decreased 82% the following year.
In 1993 Omaha changed to a more permissive policy, permitting
pursuits for offences that had previously been prohibited; the following
year the number of pursuits increased more than 600%” (Alpert, 1997,
p4). Other relevant US evidence
on police pursuits MacDonald
and Alpert (1998) conducted telephone interviews with 255 residents from
Aiken County, 300 from Omaha and 169 from Balitmore which indicated that
the public overwhelmingly supports pursuits for serious crime, but that
this support diminishes with the reduced seriousness of the offence for
which the pursuit was initiated. They found that “Support for pursuit
is strong and criticism is minimal, if it exists at all when a police
officer is shot or a felony committed. Support is minimal, especially
under high-risk conditions, when a traffic violation is pursued”
(MacDonald and Alpert, 1995, p193). In
a separate study, MacDonald, Alpert and Glover (1997) concluded, based
on data from Baltimore (July 1995 – June 1996) and Metro-Dade
(calendar year 1996), that the helicopter provides an effective means of
apprehending fleeing vehicles. The Metro-Dade helicopters were involved
in 43 pursuits, 91% resulting in an arrest (n=39). In comparison,
Baltimore helicopters were involved in 89 pursuits, 83% resulting in an
arrest (n=74). Although there were accidents resulting from the
involvement of helicopters in pursuits (Metro-Dade n=12; Baltimore na),
available data indicate that none of the accidents resulted in a serious
injury. The use of a helicopter can increase the number of cases an
agency can handle due to the flexibility and speed of the aircraft
(Hoffman ,1996). Helicopters can handle up to three times as many
service contacts as ground units (Simonsen, 1975). The authors concluded
that “Departments should examine the level of violent crime in their
communities and the number of high-speed pursuits. Departments that rank
high on both may see a helicopter as a necessity for both officer safety
(violent crime) and civil liability issues (pursuit).” (MacDonald,
Alpert and Glover, 1997, p13). However, this may be less beneficial in a
UK context where underground car parks and concealed street areas may
reduce utility. However, this has not yet been adequately tested. UK Home Office funded research
The
major UK study of deaths and injuries resulting from police vehicle
accidents was undertaken by Rix et al (1997) on behalf of the UK Home
Office’s Police Research Group (PRG) and involved a study of 770
serious injury and fatal police vehicle accidents between 1990 and 1993,
which resulted in a total of 1,117 victims of accident and 92
fatalities. In the study sample, although the police suffered almost
half of the accidents, nearly 80% of the fatalities were suffered by
members of the public. For the serious injuries, 39% occurred in
pursuit/follow situations, 29% in routine patrols and 23% while
responding to emergency calls. Almost
¾ of the police vehicles were travelling at speeds below the speed
limit at the time of the accident, while over half (55%) occurred during
the hours of darkness. In terms of the circumstances of the incidents,
some of the key findings that emerged were that: ·
15% of serious
injury/fatal PVA’s (police vehicle accidents) occurred during
pursuits/emergency responses where neither sirens or lights were in use ·
Less than 1/3 of police
drivers were breath tested following the PVA (although the policy on
this issue has since changed) ·
15% of basic drivers
involved in PVAs were participating in pursuits ·
17 (81%) of the 21
pedestrians who died as a result of a PVA had come into contact with a
police vehicle Four
police activities accounted for 96% of the fatalities: 41 (45%) died in
pursuit/follow situations, 21 (23%) when police vehicles were responding
to emergency calls, 18 (20%) when the police vehicle was on duty but
unconnected to an emergency and 8 (8%) during training exercises. 205
(27%) of the driving public involved in PVAs were in stolen vehicles. A
second level of analysis was carried out on the police drivers involved.
Peak occurs at around 25-29 years – when corrected for police profile,
younger officers appeared more likely to be involved in PVAs although
they are most likely to be involved in an operational role. Perhaps more
importantly for the current research, 36% of the advanced driver group
did not make contact with anybody or anything
(compared with 18% of standard drivers and 10% of basic drivers).
Further only 16% of advanced drivers struck other vehicles during the
PVA compared 23% of standard drivers and 32% of basic drivers, which may
have implications for who should be allowed to take part in particular
kinds of police driving behaviours. This may be linked to training and
pragmatic issues as Rix et al (op cit) also found that standard drivers
were least likely to be using both sirens and lights at the time of the
accident, while advanced drivers were most likely to have been doing so. Among
other relevant information that was gathered in the research related to
specific aspects of police driving,
233 (28%) of the drivers had previously been involved in a PVA,
and 27% involved vehicles at speeds in excess of the speed limit. Rix
et al reported that 55% of the incidents occurred during the hours of
darkness (compared to 27% for national average of all accidents), and
that the incidents peak (32.7%) between 6pm and midnight, while 28% took
place between midnight and 6am. The highest frequency of accidents
appears to be on a Friday night - while 12% of all accidents occurred on
Mondays, 16% occurred on Fridays. In
terms of the actions taken following police vehicle accidents, 375 (48%)
driving members of the public were reported for offences following the
PVA – 23% for not having valid insurance and almost 20% were reported
for theft of a vehicle. 122 (16%) members of the public were reported
for careless driving and 110 (14%) for dangerous driving. Breath tests
were requested from 248 (32%) drivers – of these, 187 (75%) proved
negative, 46 (19%) positive and 15 (6%) failed to provide a sample.
Police drivers were suspended from driving in 156 (24%) of cases, while
61% of police drivers were exonerated without any further action. 51
(7%) of police drivers were held to be blameworthy – 10 were
subsequently removed from police driving duties and the remaining 41
were re-trained and 41 police drivers were referred to the CPS. Of
these, 26 cases were supervised by the PCA – 18 police officers
received a criminal sentence, four received another penalty and two
received a driving suspension. UK
policy evidence
The
most important recent policy review was the ACPO report on Police
Pursuit Driver Training (“The Lind Report”, September 1998) whose
aims were to review police pursuit driver training and to develop a set
of national core competencies for advanced and standard police driving. The
Lind Report (ACPO, 1998) makes clear the distinction intended by the
police between pursuits and follows, citing Horner (1995) who defined a
pursuit as “where appropriately trained officers in suitable vehicles,
pursue a fleeing vehicle with the intention of safely causing it to
stop”. In contrast, Horner (op cit) defines a follow as occurring
“where a police officer safely monitors the progress of a target
vehicle, with the objective of appropriately trained officers
undertaking a “pursuit of that vehicle””. The report also cites
the ACPO (1989) report in defining pursuits as “when police attempt to
stop the driver of a motor vehicle and the driver refuses to obey the
officer, following which the police give chase for the purpose of
stopping the fleeing vehicle”. As with the Horner definition the key
terms are “fleeing vehicle” and “attempt to stop”. The
report contains a total of 33 recommendations that are divided into
sections on training, operational issues, technology and administration.
Among the most important recommendations are that pursuits should “be
subject of vigorous control and only undertaken by trained personnel”,
that “risk assessments should identify areas of organisational and
individual responsibility”, that attitudinal training should be
included in training courses, that periodic assessment of driving skills
should take place between each 3-5 years and that there should be co-ordinated
national quality procedures. The
report also recommends that driver training should be taken forward
nationally with three core courses – Basic (training to fulfil a
patrol function), Standard (which extends the basic training to include
emergency responding and night response driving) and Advanced (to enable
pursuits and high speed response driving). Further, there is the
recommendation that all vehicles that engage in pursuits and emergency
responses should be equipped with both sirens and emergency lights, and
that these vehicles should have the capacity to communicate during
pursuits and emergency responses in hands free mode. Commander
Cullen’s follow-up to the Lind Report (November 2000) indicated that
86% (n=37) of police forces in England and Wales have conducted a risk
assessment of operational police driving. However, attitudinal training
is only automatically included in driver training courses by 10 forces
(24%) and only 11 forces (25%) re-assess all drivers every 3-5 years.
Crucially, only 36 (84%) of forces follow the recommendations set out in
the joint PCA/ACPO report. Furthermore, there are considerable question
marks over the methods employed by Cullen and the adequacy of the
evaluation of implementation – which was largely based on
self-reported questionnaires from each force with no external or
independent evaluation. On
more operational issues, 67% (n=29) of forces provide training in the
hours of darkness to all drivers with two forces not providing any
night-time driving. In 25 forces (58%), controllers receive regular
hands-on pragmatic pursuit training management. Similarly, in 40 forces
(93%) all vehicles used in emergency response work are fitted with
sirens and blue lights, while 41 forces (95%) use HOSTYDS (stinger[1])
in at least some circumstances. Finally, 38 forces (88%) operate a
system that allows for the identification of ‘high risk’ drivers. Most
recently, ACPO has issued the “Road Death Investigation Manual”
(December 2001) which sets out with the aim of ensuring of
“further(ing) the interests of justice by assisting the police to deal
fairly, impartially and thoroughly with road death” and constitutes
further evidence of police recognition of the importance and gravity of
this issues and the need to allocate appropriate resources to the
investigation of serious road traffic incidents. The report points out
that “if there is uncertainty over whether a particular complaint will
be referred to the PCA, it will generally be appropriate to let the PCA
decide the issue” (p114) and that the same principle should apply to
cases involving ‘serious injury’. The report also lists the types of
incidents which might constitute a police-related road death, included
in which are deaths of officers or others conveyed in police vehicles,
deaths involving collision with a police vehicle, “death resulting to
another road user from collision involving a vehicle being followed by
police” and death resulting from other police activity on the road.
This manual constitutes a clear policy statement by ACPO that the issue
of RTI’s is a significant one that the police treat with the utmost
priority and that requires the highest level of independent
investigation. Method
According
to the Lind Report (1989) “Police vehicle accidents resulting in death
or life threatening injury or where the circumstances may be a matter of
public interest have normally been voluntarily referred to the PCA under
Section 88 PACE Act 1984. Such openness is to be applauded and is
recommended as good practice”. The
current report examines cases referred in this way and accepted by the
Police Complaints Authority for supervision. The inclusion criteria for
the study were that the case occurred between 1998 and 2001 and that,
even if the case had not been completed by the time of writing, the
Investigating officer’s report had been received. The cases included
in the study are those received by the PCA and coded on the PCA database
as RTI’s (Road Traffic Incidents) or which have been identified by the
research team as such during the data trawl component of the study. In
terms of the timing of the incidents – 16 were drawn from 1998, 21
from 1999, 26 from 2000 and 22 from 2001 – however, this refers to
completed cases and so this is not a comprehensive total for 2001.
However, in spite of the Lind comment above, concerns remain about
inconsistencies in the number of cases referred to the PCA and in the
number of serious injury cases that are not accepted for supervision by
the PCA. This creates uncertainty over the representativeness of the
sample, although it is unlikely that any deaths will have been excluded
in this period. The
rationale for the study was, in the light of the reported increase in
fatal RTI’s in the PCA Annual Report, to examine the factors that
surround the referred cases in terms of: ·
Environmental factors ·
Characteristics of the
driver of the victim or pursued vehicle ·
Characteristics of the
police driver (and police passenger where this is appropriate) ·
Quality of communications
and supervision ·
Rationale for undertaking
the pursuit/follow or response ·
Typical speeds and
distances between the vehicles where this is relevant ·
Issues around the
investigation of incidents and the outcome ·
Identifying the lessons to
be learned To
achieve this, an initial set of 5 files were identified and examined by
the research team and a pro forma for data collection was developed on
the basis of material available in the files and the key questions
identified in the examination of the policy and research literature. The
method was mixed with a primarily quantitative social research database
(subsequently entered on SPSS v10) supplemented by brief synopses of
each case to supplement the quantitative data. One of the major aims of
the project was, unusually, to identify the levels of missing data for
particular topics to assist in the standardisation of future data
collection during the course of subsequent research projects. The
primary source of data – the PCA case file – consists of the police
investigation of each incident and a correspondence file between the
relevant parties which outline the PCA action on the case and the
aetiology of the decision-making around investigation and subsequent
discipline if this is relevant. Inevitably there are inconsistencies
within reports (for instance, between witnesses about the distance
between vehicles during the course of pursuits and about the speed they
were travelling at), in which case the data recorded is that indicated
by the IO, if any indication of this is given in his or her report. It
is also worth noting that, with the increased piloting and availability
of IDRs (‘black boxes’), some of these issues may, in time, be
resolved technologically. Where this is not available, the witness
testimony is used with a simple averaging process having been employed
where ranges are offered by one or more witnesses. Where the data is too
inconsistent or unreliable the variable has been coded as missing. In
the discussion section, the limitations of the research design are
discussed. Inferential
statistics have been included to designate whether differences between
groups can be regarded as being reliable. The convention of 95%
confidence has been used; therefore, where a test is designated ‘ns’
(not significant), this means that there is more than a 5% possibility
that the result occurred by chance. For those differences designated as
significant, three codes reflecting confidence in findings are used: 1.
P<0.05 – less than a 5% chance that the difference is a
result of chance alone 2.
P<0.01 – less than a 1% chance that the difference is a
result of chance alone 3.
P<0.001 – less than a 0.1% chance that the difference is a
result of chance alone Results
Note
on measurements used: One yard = 92 cms 1 mile = 1.6
kilometres The
study consists of 85 supervised road traffic incidents (RTIs) that
occurred between 1998 and 2001 and which were referred to the PCA for
supervision. The breakdown of these cases is 64 pursuits/follows (this
distinction is considered at length in the discussion section), 14
emergency response incidents, 4 standard patrol incidents, 2 incidents
involving officers coming off duty and one possible suicide. The
strategy for analysis will be to consider the total number of 85
incidents as a group and then to focus on the pursuit/follows as a
specific group. The
severity of the cases is indicated by the fact that the 85 incidents
resulted in a total of 91 fatalities – although12 of the cases were
serious injury only, 61 involved the death of one individual, 7 involved
two deaths, 4 involved three deaths and one of the incidents resulted in
the deaths of all four occupants of a vehicle. Both the rates of
referral and the style of investigations vary between forces – with
the majority of the investigations having been undertaken by officers
from professional standards departments (n=62), while 10 have been
investigated by traffic departments and 13 of the investigations have
been led by officers from other departments (including road policing and
operational command). The
investigations were generally overseen by chief inspectors (n=34) or
superintendents (n=28), although a smaller number were led by inspectors
(n=20) and 3 by chief superintendents. In all but four of the 85 cases,
the investigation was conducted by the home force, with only four
investigations conducted by external forces. Locations
There
was no clear pattern to the forces involved in the supervised cases –
of the 43 police forces in England and Wales, 31 forces that have been
included in the study. The forces that referred the greatest number of
RTI’s that have been included are the Metropolitan Police Service(n=12),
West Yorkshire (n=11), Greater Manchester Police (n=9), Sussex (n=6) and
South Yorkshire (n=5). None of the other forces included referred more
than three cases that have been included (for full list of locations see
Appendix 1). The
majority of the incidents (defined as the scene of the major collision)
occurred in towns (n=70), with 14 taking place on country roads and one
on a motorway. Fifty-one of the incidents occurred on A roads, 9 on B
roads, 23 on roads not classified and 2 on other types of highway. The
majority of incidents (n=63) were on single carriageway roads with a
further 15 on two-lane or dual carriageway roads, 5 on 3-lane roads and
2 on 4-lane roads. The
average distance to the nearest junction was 61 yards, although this
data point is skewed by the fact that 35 of the incidents took place at
junctions. The closest junction to the incident was most commonly either
a T-junction (n=29) or an access road (n=27), with a further 8 incidents
occurring at or near crossroads, 6 at or near lights, 6 at or near
roundabouts, 4 at or near pedestrian crossings and the remaining 5 near
other forms of junctions. Of those incidents that did not happen at
junctions, 28 occurred on bends and 22 on straight sections of road. In
23 of the incidents the collisions occurred on sections of road that had
road calming measures. Other environmental factors
In
terms of natural lighting, 56 of the incidents occurred after dark with
4 during dusk or dawn and 25 during daylight hours. Of those that did
not happen during daylight, there was full artificial lighting in 36,
partial light in 8 and no lighting in 16. In the majority of cases the
road was described as ‘quite quiet’ (n=40) or ‘almost deserted’
(n=26), with only 15 incidents occurring when the road was either
‘busy’ or ‘very busy’. The vast majority of incidents (61/85)
occurred in 30 mph speed limit zones. Surprisingly,
the majority of incidents occurred in dry weather (n=64), 14 in light
rain or wet road conditions, 4 in heavy rain and 3 in other weather
conditions (fog, ice or snow). Most commonly the incidents occurred
during the night (between midnight and 6am)(n=38), then in the evenings
(between 6pm and midnight)(n=25) with a further 16 occurring in the
afternoons (between midday and 6pm) and 5 in the mornings (between 6am
and midday). There
was not an even spread of incidents across the week with more incidents
occurring at the weekends (22 on Sundays and 15 on Saturdays) than on
weekdays (11 each on Mondays and Wednesdays, 10 on Fridays, 9 on
Tuesdays and 6 on Thursdays). Comparisons of pursuit/follows and the other files included in the study
While
there are fundamental difficulties in making comparisons across
categories of events, the most straightforward comparison was between
the police drivers involved in the 64 pursuit/follows and the 21 drivers
involved in other police-related road traffic incidents. The basic
differences are shown in Table 1 below:
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